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SUMMARY
There are today approximately 2000 hydroelectric projects 
operating under licenses from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). Because many of these licenses were issued 
for 50-year terms beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, they are or 
soon will be eligible for relicensing. As FERC confronts 
hundreds of relicensing proceedings between now and the end of 
the century, it must reevaluate the wisdom of each project based 
upon today's more sophisticated legal and environmental 
standards. This task is made difficult because the projects 
often were subjected to little or no environmental scrutiny in 
their initial licensing.
FERC has a statutory obligation to license only those 
hydroelectric projects that are best adapted to a comprehensive 
plan for resource development. To achieve this goal, FERC is 
directed to consult with other federal and state government 
agencies. FERC's ability to achieve the goal is complicated by 
the existence of state water laws which the Federal Power Act has 
directed FERC to respect.
The degree of respect which FERC must accord to state water 
laws has been a matter of dispute for almost fifty years. At one 
extreme are the states which insist that FERC cannot interfere 
with any state water laws, whether they be water rights laws or 
regulatory laws governing the use of those water rights. FERC, 
at the other extreme, insists that it need only adhere to those 
state water laws which are consistent with the regulatory scheme 
set forth in the Federal Power Act, and may ignore all others.
The better view is that the Federal Power Act establishes a 
system of concurrent state and federal control in which FERC 
licensees must comply with state laws unless FERC affirmatively 
determines that to do so would conflict with the purposes of the 
Federal Power Act.
The interaction between federal and state regulation under 
the Federal Power Act was the principal issue in a opinion 
announced by the Supreme Court several weeks ago. The Court's 
resolution of the issue —  largely if not entirely in FERC's 
favor —  still leaves open a number of questions about FERC's 




A. Congress has the authority to protect the navigable 
waters of the United States under the commerce clause 
of the Constitution (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 3, cl. 2).
1. Since Congress has the authority to exclude all 
structures from navigable waters of the United 
States, it can condition permission to build such 
structures upon grant of a license.
2. To a large extent, congressional authority to 
control navigable waters has been subsumed under 
it broader commerce clause powers (Oklahoma ex 
rel. Phillips v. Guv F. Atchison Co.. 313 U.S. 508 
(1941)).
B. Congress also has the authority under the supremacy 
clause to occupy the entire field of regulation of 
hydroelectric power and thereby supercede any 
conflicting state laws on the subject (U.S. Const. Art. 
IV, § 2) .
C. Notwithstanding clear constitutional authority to do 
so, Congress and the Supreme Court both have been 
reluctant to assert congressional supreme authority to 
regulate all matters relating to navigable waters of 
the United States, including especially matters 
relating to proprietary water rights which form the 
backbone of the economy in the western United States
2
(See United States v. New Mexico. 438 U.S. 696, 702 
n.5 (1978) (citing reference to 37 statutes which 
indicate congressional deference to state water laws); 
California v. United States. 438 U.S. 645 (1978) 
(holding that the federal government must comply with 
state water law in obtaining water for federal 
reclamation projects)).
1. The federal policy of deference to state water law 
originated in the egual footing doctrine which 
holds that the states have sovereign right, title, 
and interest to all navigable waters within their 
boundaries subject to the congressional power to 
regulate commerce and navigation (see Oregon v. 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.. 429 U.S. 363 (1977); 
S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951)
(quoted in California v. United States. 438 U.S. 
645 (1978)).
2. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, for 
example, defers to state water rights law (43 
U.S.C.§§ 372, 383.
3. The 1944 Flood Control Act contains the policy 
statement that it is declared to be the policy of 
the Congress "to recognize the interests and 
rights of the States ... in water utilization and 
control."
4. The Supreme Court has held that each state is
3
entitled to establish its own system of water 
rights subject to two limitations: federal 
reserved water rights, and the federal navigation 
servitude (California v. United States. 438 U.S. 
645 (1978) (citing United States v. Rio Grande Dam 
and Irrigation Co.. 174 U.S. 690 (1899))).
D. The Federal Power Act was enacted to promote the 
private development of hydroelectric power in the 
United States (Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch.
825, 41 Stat. 1063; Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49
Stat. 863, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828).
E. The Federal Power Act was premised on the principle 
that the electric power potential of the nation's 
navigable waterways is a public resource which should 
be harnessed in a manner consistent with the public 
interest.
1. The Federal Power Act granted comprehensive 
authority to the Federal Power Commission (now the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or FERC) to 
administer and regulate all hydroelectric 
development occurring on navigable waters in the
United States (see California v. FERC. ___ U.S. __
1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
2. The Federal Power Act requires that FERC consider 
all beneficial public uses of water in deciding 
whether and under what terms and conditions to
4
issue a hydroelectric project license (Federal 
Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C.§ 803(a)).
3. The Federal Power Commission is made the "guardian 
of the public domain" with regard to water within 
navigable streams (Federal Power Comm'n v. Idaho 
Power Co.. 344 U.S. 17 (1952)).
4. FERC must impose conditions on every license for a 
hydroelectric project to require its adaption to a 
comprehensive plan for multiple use of federally 
regulated waterways (Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 
U.S.C. § 803(a)).
F. Since enactment of the Federal Power Act, there has
been a great expansion in the federal commerce clause 
authority and a concomitant expansion in breadth of 
federal regulation under the Federal Power Act.
(United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.. 311 U.S. 
377 (1940); see generally Note, Small Hydropower 
Projects and State Water Rights, 18 Pac. L. J. 1225 
(1987) ) .
1. Federal power over navigable waters is plenary.
2. States and private parties retain authority to 
control or hold rights in such waters only subject 
to "the power of Congress to control the waters 
for the purpose of commerce." (United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co.. 311 U.S. 377 (1940) 
(quoting United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation
5
Co.. 174 U.S. 690 (1899))).
II. RECOGNITION OF ROLE OF STATE LAW IN REGULATION OF
HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
A. The Federal Power Act recognizes that federal
regulation of hydroelectric power may conflict with
state regulation of water rights, an area of
traditional state authority in which the federal
government has been reluctant to intrude.
1. Section 9 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 802, requires an applicant for a license under 
the Federal Power Act to submit "satisfactory" 
evidence that it has complied with the 
requirements of state law of the state within 
which the project is to be located. The term 
"satisfactory evidence" is not defined in the 
statute.
2. Section 27 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 821, is known as the savings or anti-preemption 
clause. The section provides that the Federal 
Power Act is not to be construed as "affecting or 
intending to affect or .. interfere" with state 
laws on control, appropriation, use, or 
distribution of water.
a. Identical or similar language preserving 
state water law appears in other federal 
regulatory and natural resources statutes,
6
including the Desert Land Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 321, and the Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 372, 383.
b. Although the language of such clauses is 
relatively similar, the clauses cannot be 
read interchangeably; the reach of an anti­
preemption clause is determined by the 
context of the particular statute (compare 
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop, v. Federal 
Power Comm1n. 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (Federal
Power Act) with California v. United States. 
438 U.S. 645 (1978) (Reclamation Act) and 
California Oregon Power Co v. Beaver Portland 
Cement Co.. 295 U.S. 142 (1935) (Desert Land
Act); see also California v. FERC. ___ U.S. _
_1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990) (legislative 
history, not just the language of the statute 
is important for understanding the meaning of 
similar language in varied statutes)).
3. Section 9 prescribes the evidentiary burden which 
an applicant bears in a FERC licensing proceeding 
while section 27 addresses an applicant's 
obligation to comply with state law, independent 
of the federal licensing process.
B. Section 27 was not intended to be a general provision 
applicable to protect all state laws from federal
7
supremacy; it was not supposed to override more 
specific provisions of the Federal Power Act. Instead 
of an absolute protection for state-granted rights, 
arguably, section 27 only allows for compensation when 
the grant of a federal license results in taking of 
such rights (Portland General Electric Co. v. Federal 
Power Comm'n. 328 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964); see Grand 
River Dam Auth. v. Grand-Hydro. 335 U.S. 359 (1948)).
1. Section 27 must be seen as a protection against a 
taking; a recognition that holders of vested state 
water rights have proprietary interests worthy of 
protection as property rights under the 
Constitution.
2. Section 27 merely complements the provision of the
Federal Power Act which permits federal licensees 
to exercise powers of eminent domain (Federal 
Power Act § 21, 16 U.S.C.§ 814).
3. The purpose of section 27 in part was to clarify 
that the mere passage of the Federal Power Act did 
not act to abrogate state usufructuary rights 
(Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp.. 347 U.S. 239 (1954)).
4. Section 27 continued the well-established 
congressional deference to state water law under 
the equal footing doctrine.
C. Section 9 was intended to guide FERC discretionary
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authority where a state expressed a regulatory or
policy interest in a potential license.
1. Compliance with state regulatory laws is not a 
condition precedent to issuance of a FERC license.
2. FERC, in its discretion, may reguire total or 
partial compliance with state regulatory 
requirements; nevertheless, FERC's obligation 
always is to ensure that the purposes of the 
Federal Power Act are achieved.
3. The purpose of section 9 is largely informational: 
FERC licensing decisions should be based upon 
knowledge of state regulatory requirements so that 
a decision to disregard or comply with state law 
will be an informed one.
4. FERC may disregard state law, if in its 
discretion, such action is consistent with its 
statutory mandate (see State of Oregon v. Idaho 
Power Co.. 312 P.2d 583 (Or. 1957) (state 
licensing superfluous for a federal licensee); 
Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Federal Power Comm1n. 
308 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert, denied. 372 
U.S. 908 (1963); accord Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n. 453 F.2d 463 
(2d Cir. 1971) (FERC has discretion to determine 
whether federal license will interfere with state 
law), cert, denied. 407 U.S. 926 (1972)).
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5. FERC may not impose conditions on a hydropower 
project license which would have the effect of 
displacing state tort law; Congress did not intend 
to authorize FERC to preempt such laws (South 
Carolina Public Service Auth. v. FERC. 850 F.2d 
788 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) .
D. Read together, sections 9 and 27 of the Federal Power 
Act demonstrate plenary federal control over regulation 
of hydropower, with few caveats (see generally.
Comment, "Hydroelectric Power, the Federal Power Act 
and State Water Laws: Is Federal Preemption Water Over 
the Dam?" 17 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1179 (1984); Wolfe, 
"Hydropower: FERC Licensing and Emerging State-Federal 
Water Rights Conflicts," 29 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
851 (1983)).
1. State proprietary rights survived passage of the
Federal Power Act and cannot be extinguished by 
FERC order (Federal Power Comm1n v. Niagara Mohawk 
Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); Georgia Power 
Co. v. Baker. 830 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1987)).
2. If state proprietary rights are taken, adequate 
compensation must be provided (Portland General 
Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n. 328 F.2d 165 
(9th Cir. 1964); Henry Ford & Son. Inc, v. Little 
Falls Fibre Co.. 280 U.S. 369 (1930).
E. Although not explicitly outlined in the statute, the
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Federal Power Act clearly contemplates a system of 
dual, or concurrent government control, in which the 
federal and state governments share control over 
hydroelectric projects (First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop, 
v. Federal Power Comm'n. 328 U.S. 152 (1945);
California v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May
21, 1990)).
1. Concurrent federal and state control is not 
unusual in federal environmental and natural 
resources regulatory statutes.
a. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401, 403 provides for joint jurisdiction 
by the states and the Army Corps of 
Engineers.
b. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1344(a) 
provides that a condition precedent for 
issuance of a permit by the Army Corps of 
Engineers is the obtaining of a state water 
quality certification.
2. Dual or concurrent authority is necessary to 
resolve the apparent conflict between FERC's 
obligations under section 10(a) to engage in 
comprehensive planning and its obligation under 
section 27 to respect state water laws.
F. Congress recognized that, because of the subject and
scope of its jurisdiction, FERC frequently either would
ll
cooperate or conflict with state regulatory agencies. 
Congress chose to require cooperation wherever possible 
(see, e.q. . Federal Power Act § 7 (preference to states 
and municipalities in issuance of licenses); § 10(j) 
(consultation with states on fish and wildlife 
protection); § 19 (provision of electricity subject to 
state regulation)).
G. Where cooperation was not desirable or practical,
specific provisions of the Federal Power Act explicitly 
designate whether state or federal law will apply (see, 
e.q., Federal Power Act § 27 (states control 
appropriation and use of water), § 10(a) (federal 
control over comprehensive planning for hydroelectric 
development)).
III. HISTORICAL EFFORTS TO AVOID OR RESOLVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL LAW ON HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT
A. First Iowa is the seminal case in the field. In that 
case, the Supreme Court held that concurrent 
jurisdiction over hydropower resources by state and 
federal government was unworkable. (First Iowa Hydro- 
Electric Coop, v. Federal Power Commission. 328 U.S.
152 (1946)).
1. First Iowa established the law that, except where 
proprietary rights are at issue, compliance with 
state laws is required only when, and to the 
extent that, the Federal Power Commission deems 
compliance to be necessary.
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Section 27 preserves only state proprietary rights 
laws and not state regulatory laws.
First Iowa limited the reach of section 27 of the 
Federal Power Act to the protection of state- 
granted proprietary rights, most important among 
which is state water rights.
First Iowa did not define the limits, if any, on 
state authority over water rights and the extent 
to which a state could use its property law to 
regulate a hydropower project.
a. For example, the Court did not decide whether 
a state can regulate a hydroelectric project 
under the guise of protecting water rights; 
such an exercise of state authority would be 
consistent with the First Iowa protection of 
state proprietary rights but would conflict 
with the prohibition on state regulation of 
federally-licensed hydroelectric projects.
b. The Court did not draw a bright line between 
state proprietary water rights and state 
regulatory water rights, a distinction which 
the Court has done nothing to clarify (see
California v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS
2614 (May 21, 1990)).
Unlike section 27 of the Federal Power Act, which 
provides substantive protection to proprietary
rights, section 9 provides merely discretionary 
authority to FERC; compliance with state laws 
under section 9 is not a condition precedent to a 
FERC license.
6. Although the proceeding at issue in First Iowa 
primarily concerned section 9, the Court has 
rejected the argument that its discussion of 
section 27 —  including the limitation of that 
section to proprietary rights -- is mere dicta 
(see generally Petitioner's Opening Brief, 
California v. FERC. (U.S. Supreme Ct. No. 89-333)
(Jan. 11, 1990); California v. FERC, ___ U.S. __
1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
B. Since First Iowa, courts have consistently applied the 
reasoning in that case to hold that states have had 
limited -- or no —  role in regulating hydroelectric 
development or operation of hydroelectric projects. 
(See, e.q.. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma. 357 
U.S. 320 (1958); Federal Power Comm1n v. Oregon, 3 49 
U.S. 435 (1955); California ex rel. State Water 
Resources Bd. v. FERC. 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power 
Comm1n. 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 
U.S. 926 (1972); Washington Dep't of Game v. Federal 
Power Comm1n. 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert, 
denied. 347 U.S. 936 (1954); Town of Springfield v.
14
McCarren. 549 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1982), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 942 (1983); Town of Springfield v. 
Vermont Envtl. Bd.. 521 F. Supp. 243 (D. Vt. 1981)).
C. It generally is accepted that the federal government 
has occupied the entire field of hydroelectric power 
regulation because of the pervasiveness of the federal 
scheme (see Town of Springfield v. Vermont Envtl. Bd.. 
521 F. Supp. 243 (D. Vt. 1981); City of Tacoma v. 
Taxpayers of Tacoma. 262 P.2d 214 (Wash. 1953)).
D. Although interpreting the Reclamation Act rather than 
the Federal Power Act, California v. United States has 
been widely cited for the proposition that states 
retain the power not only to grant but also to regulate 
water rights notwithstanding federal regulatory 
controls (California v. United States. 438 U.S. 645 
(1978)) .
1. At issue was section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 
1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383, a provision whose 
language is virtually identical to section 27 of 
the Federal Power Act.
2. The Court held that section 8 was designed to 
protect more than only proprietary rights and was 
broad enough to preclude preemption of any state 
law governing water use or allocation.
3. The Court held that a state may impose conditions 
on a federal reclamation project so long as those
15





a. The Court found that federal directives for 
management of reclamation lands were not 
inconsistent with deference to state water 
laws.
b. To preclude application of that holding to 
its proceedings, FERC has taken the position 
that the Court's requirement for consistency 
with the federal scheme exempts it from 
virtually all state water laws because of the 
pervasive federal regulation of hydroelectric 
facilities articulated in section 10 of the 
Federal Power Act.
The holding specifically applied to a state's 
ability to regulate water rights. The Court held 
that the legislative history made it "abundantly 
clear" that Congress intended "to defer to the 
substance, as well as the form" of state water law 
(California v. United States. 438 U.S. at 675).
The only limitation on the Secretary of Interior's 
obligation to comply with state law is that such 
laws cannot be applied if to do so would conflict 
with "clear congressional directives." (California 
v. United States. 438 U.S. at 672)
The Supreme Court has rejected the assertion that
16
the case called into question, or even overruled, 
sub silentio. the application of First Iowa to 
section 27 of the Federal Power Act (California v. 
FERC, ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
a. If the same interpretation were applied to 
section 27 of the Federal Power Act as that 
used by the Court in discussing section 8 of 
the Reclamation Act, the reach of section 27 
would be broadened substantially.
b. The congressional directive favoring 
comprehensive federal regulation and the 
displacing of state laws is clearer in the 
Federal Power Act.
c. Application of the anti-preemption provisions 
of the Reclamation Act would not frustrate 
the very purpose of that statute since it is 
not, at its heart, a regulatory statute. The 
contrary is true for the Federal Power Act.
E. The courts have never adequately defined what state
rights fall within the protection of section 27; while 
courts have been virtually unanimous in making the 
distinction between property rights and governmental, 
police, or regulatory powers, they rarely have been 
called upon to make finer distinctions.
1. The Ninth Circuit in California ex rel. State
Water Resources Bd. v. FERC somewhat incompletely
17
quoted the First Iowa decision as defining 
proprietary rights as applying only to "municipal 
and irrigation proprietary rights."
2. State interest in protection of non-game wildlife 
is probably not a proprietary interest, especially 
in light of the strong federal interest (see 
Missouri v. Holland. 252 U.S. 416 (1920)).
3. Even protection of fisheries, which has a strong 
proprietary component because of the importance of 
fisheries to many states' economies, may not fall 
within the protection of section 27 (California ex 
rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC, 877 F.2d 
743 (9th Cir. 1989)).
4. Although states have an interest in protection of 
inchoate proprietary rights, courts have 
consistently referred to the section 27 savings 
clause as designed to protect only vested rights
(see Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Federal Power 
Comm1n. 328 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964); there is no 
indication that the section 27 protections are 
designed to protect rights for which no 
compensation would be available under the takings 
clause of the United States Constitution (see 
State of Oregon v. Idaho Power Co.. 312 P.2d 583 
(Or. 1957)).
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IV. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND FERC ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE
PROBLEMS OF DUAL STATE-FEDERAL CONTROL
A. The FERC, and before it the Federal Power Commission, 
traditionally has viewed itself as being the final 
arbiter of matters affecting the nation's hydroelectric 
power resources.
B. Consistent with that position, FERC has only 
reluctantly complied with conflicting or competing 
statutory and regulatory regimes, whether they concern 
federal environmental statutes or state water rights 
laws.
1. For example, FERC did not promulgate regulations 
implementing its environmental review procedures 
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act 
until 1987, almost 20 years after the statute was 
enacted (see 18 C.F.R. Part 380).
2. Congress' enactment of the Electric Consumers 
Protection Act was in large part brought about by 
FERC's reluctance to give due consideration to 
fish and wildlife and other non-power resources, 
in the hydroelectric licensing process (see H.R. 
Rep. No. 507, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)).
3. FERC has found that as a condition of its issuing 
a hydroelectric license, it may limit a licensee's 
ability to use its state-adjudicated water rights 
(see, e.g.. Conway Ranch. 46 FERC H 62,332 (1989);
19
Howard & Mildred Carter. 40 FERC 51 61,280 (1987)).
C. Relying on First Iowa. FERC consistently has rejected
assertions by state agencies, individual water users, 
and project licensees that it should defer to state 
water rights law in determining how a project should be 
operated. (see Henwood Assocs., Inc., 50 FERC 51 61,183
(1990); Twin Falls Canal Co.. 45 FERC 51 61,423 (1988)).
D. In analysis which belies the clouded line between 
section 9 and 27, FERC frequently has overruled state 
attempts to exercise authority over water releases from 
hydroelectric projects by holding that the Federal 
Power Act creates an exclusively federal regulatory 
scheme (see Guadaloupe-Blanco River Auth.. 42 FERC
51 61,079 (1988); Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 38 
FERC 5[ 61,240, reh * q denied. 41 FERC 61,198 (1987); 
Roseburq Resources. 41 FERC 51 61,142 (1987)).
E. More recently, FERC appears to be resolving conflicts 
with state water law by characterizing its decisions as 
being the best comprehensive use of the waterway, 
thereby cloaking its decisions with the protection of 
section 9's requirement that state law can apply to the 
extent that it is not inconsistent with the purpose of 
the Federal Power Act (see Brazos River Auth.. 48 FERC 
51 62,190 (1989); Twin Falls Canal Co. . 45 FERC f 61,423
(1988); accord California v. FERC. __  U.S. ___1990
LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
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1. The use of the terminology "best comprehensive 
use" is derived from section 10(a) of the Federal 
Power Act which always has required FERC to 
balance competing uses of navigable waters.
2. The Electric Consumers Protection Act strengthened 
the importance of section 10(a) by requiring that 
FERC give "equal consideration" to power and non­
power uses, thereby allowing FERC further 
discretionary authority to find state laws not to 
be consistent with the "best comprehensive use" of 
a waterway.
3. As a result of the revision to section 10(a) in 
the Electric Consumers Protection Act, FERC's 
authority was strengthened even more since it now 
is required to take a more activist role; it can 
no longer rely on state recommendations but must 
itself determine the appropriate resource mix for 
hydroelectric development (see, e. g . . Central 
Nebraska Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist.. 50 FERC
61,180 (1990); Northern Lights. Inc.. 39 FERC 
61,352 (1987)) .
F. FERC perceives its authority to prescribe water release 
regimes to be limited only by actions of other federal 
agencies (see, e.g.. Henwood Assocs., Inc.. 50 FERC 
f 61,183 (1990) (conflict with Bureau of Land 
Management); Eugene Water and Elec. Bd.. 49 FERC
21
5 61,211 (1989) (conflict with Army Corps of 
Engineers).
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING FERC AUTHORITY TO REGULATE 
WATER RIGHTS
A. Recent developments have focused attention anew on the 
long unresolved debate over the proper respective roles 
of the states and federal governments in controlling 
the hydroelectric power resource.
1. Enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act and related statutes produced an 
explosion in applications for new hydroelectric 
project permits (see generally M.C. Whittaker,
"The Federal Power Act and Hydropower Development: 
Rediscovering State Regulatory Powers and 
Responsibilities," 10 Harv. Envtl. L.R. 135 
(1986)).
2. The expiration of the licenses on hundreds of
projects licensed for fifty-year terms in the 
early days of the Federal Power Act has provided 
an unusual opportunity to reexamine the 
environmental desirability of these projects (see 
52 Fed. Reg. 4648 (Feb. 13, 1987) (list of
hydropower licenses expiring from 1987 through 
2000)); FERC is facing license applications in 
numbers not seen for fifty years. Both the 
hydroelectric industry and environmental 
organizations are viewing this historical
22
phenomenon as an opportunity.
B. Enactment of Electric Consumers Protection Act, Pub. L.
99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986).
1. The Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986 was 
the first significant revision to the 
hydroelectric project licensing provisions of the 
Federal Power Act since the 1920s (see generally 
J.D. Echeverria, "The Electric Consumers 
Protection Act of 1986," 8 Energy L.J. 61 (1987); 
J.H. Bornong, "The Electric Consumer Protection 
Act of 1986: Changes in Hydro Licensing?," 23 
Gonzaga L.R. 135 (1987)).
2. The importance of the new statute comes not only 
from its provisions but from the time at which it 
was enacted. The environmental impacts of the 
expiring licenses generally never had been 
examined. The renewal of licenses offered the 
first opportunity to scrutinize the environmental 
impacts of hydropower projects and to impose new 
conditions to protect watershed ecology (see 
generally J.H. Bornong, "The Electric Consumer 
Protection Act of 1986: Changes in Hydro 
Licensing?," 23 Gonzaga L.R. 135 (1987); J.D. 
Echeverria et al.. Rivers At Risk (1989)).
3. One of the major goals of the Electric Consumers 
Protection Act was to ensure that FERC pays more
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attention to environmental concerns in deciding 
whether to issue hydroelectric project licenses 
(See generally J.D. Echeverria, "The Electric 
Consumers Protection Act of 1986," 8 Energy L.J.
61 (1987)) .
4. The statute adds both substantive and procedural 
provisions elevating the importance of 
environmental issues.
a. New substantive provisions were added to 
section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act 
requiring FERC to "give equal consideration 
to the purposes of energy conservation, the 
protection, mitigation of damage to, and 
enhancement of, fish and wildlife, ... the 
protection of recreational opportunities, and 
the preservation of other aspects of 
environmental quality." (Electric Consumers 
Protection Act § 3(a), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e); 
see also Electric Consumers Protection Act 
§ 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (adding 
environmental protection issues to the 
factors that FERC must consider in issuing 
licenses)). The purpose of these provisions 
was to change FERC's public interest review 
standards (see Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n. 
387 U.S. 428 (1966)) to improve consideration
24
of environmental factors (H.R. Rep. No. 934, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2496 (1986) (conference 
committee report on the statute)).
b. New procedural requirements now require FERC 
to solicit and consider the views of other 
federal and state agencies on environmental 
issues (Electric Consumers Protection Act
§ 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(2)(B)). The 
statute also establishes a complicated 
consultation procedure requiring close 
consultation between FERC and state and 
federal fish and wildlife agencies (Electric 
Consumers Protection Act § 10(j), 16 U.S.C.
§ 803(j)). Notwithstanding the consultation 
requirement, FERC has the discretion to 
reject recommendations under certain 
circumstances.
c. FERC must adopt license conditions based upon 
recommendations it receives from state and 
federal fish and wildlife agencies. If it 
appears to FERC that the recommendations "may 
be inconsistent with the purposes" of the 
Federal Power Act or any other "applicable 
law," FERC must resolve the inconsistency by 
giving "due weight" to the recommendations
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and the "expertise, and statutory 
responsibilities" of the recommending 
agencies (Electric Consumers Protection Act 
§ 10(j) , 16 U.S.C. § 803 (j)) .
d. FERC's authority under the Electric Consumers 
Protection Act to reject environmental 
protection recommendations as being contrary 
to law is consistent with FERC's authority 
under section 9 of the Federal Power Act to 
accept or reject state law reguirements.
e. The statute disclaims any congressional
intent to "alter or establish the respective 
rights of states, the United States ... or 
any person with respect to any water or 
water-related right." (Electric Consumers 
Protection Act § 17, 100 Stat. 1259, 16
U.S.C. § 797 note)
5. The statute directs FERC to apply new, and 
greater, scrutiny to relicense applications to 
ensure that each project meets today's more 
sophisticated standards for whether resource 
development is in the public interest (see H.R. 
Rep. No. 507, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 
1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2496 (1986)).
6. The new statute does not refer explicitly to, or 
give guidance on how to resolve, disputes which
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might arise between FERC's new environmental 
protection responsibilities and state proprietary 
rights. The legislative history of the Electric 
Consumers Protection Act, on the contrary, focuses 
only on recommendations which are "inconsistent 
with the purposes and requirements" of the Federal 
Power Act. The conference report explains that 
FERC's discretionary authority is intended to 
ensure that environmental protection 
recommendations do not give commenting agencies a 
veto over FERC license decisions (H.R. Rep. No. 
934, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)).
7. The Electric Consumers Protection Act has no 
provision for FERC to receive or consider comments 
from state agencies responsible for protecting 
proprietary rights. The statute did not change or 
clarify the interplay between sections 9 and 27 of 
the Federal Power Act. Instead, the statute 
reaffirms —  and strengthens —  FERC's ultimate 
authority to reconcile public interests affected 
by hydroelectric development, including fish and 
wildlife protection and recreation (see California
v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21,
1990)).
8. Because the new statute was the first major 
revision of the Federal Power Act since the
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Supreme Court's decision in First Iowa. Congress
had an opportunity —  which it declined —  to 
explain or change how the dual authority of 
federal and state laws is intended to operate.
a. Congress' failure to address First Iowa and 
the virtually unbroken line of cases striking 
down most mandatory state regulations 
affecting hydroelectric projects suggests 
congressional satisfaction with the current 
division of authority.
b. Notwithstanding established law that FERC has 
occupied the field of hydroelectric power 
regulation, the Electric Consumers Protection 
Act also makes FERC the regulator of 
environmental and wildlife protection laws. 
There is no indication in the plain language 
of the statute that Congress intended for 
FERC to occupy this field as well.
c. The role of states as advisors in the FERC 
licensing process is consistent with First 
Iowa and its progeny which contemplate a 
system of dual state and federal jurisdiction 
in which FERC is the ultimate arbiter of 
conflicts.
C. The Electric Consumers Protection Act must be viewed in 
the context of other congressional environmental
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protection and energy enactments of the 1970s and 
1980s, all of which preserved federal control over 
these issues.
1. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
encouraged the development of small hydroelectric 
projects through financial and regulatory 
incentives, but retained FERC control over the 
licensing and regulation of these projects (Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. 95-617,
92 Stat. 3117 (1978)).
2. The federal environmental protection laws, 
including the National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361, the Endangered Species 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543, and the Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287, enforce 
procedural and substantive environmental 
protections in which the states have only an 
advisory role.
D. The Ninth Circuit's decision in California ex rel.
State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC. 877 F.2d 743 (9th 
Cir. 1989) offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to 
clarify the interplay of sections 9 and 27 in cases 
where there is no bright line between state water and 
regulatory laws.
1. The Ninth Circuit held that the California Water
Resources Control Board did not have the authority
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to set minimum water flow rates downstream which 
were more stringent than FERC had set for the same 
project as conditions of the FERC license because 
the FERC license preempted state law.
2. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected California 
v. United States. 438 U.S. 645, and its progeny, 
construing language in the Reclamation Act of 1902 
which is substantially similar to section 27, and 
held that all aspects of state hydroelectric 
regulation are preempted by federal law, except 
for state proprietary rights. The court 
distinguished both the purpose and the nature of 
the federal regulatory interest expressed in the 
two statutes in holding that Reclamation Act 
jurisprudence is not directly applicable to the 
Federal Power Act.
3. There is some dispute whether the California law
at issue was actually a proprietary rights law; 
California does not recognize a proprietary right 
in instream flows (see Brief of Respondent Rock 
Creek Ltd. Ptshp., California v. FERC, (U.S. 
Supreme Ct. No. 89-333) (Feb. 12, 1990)).
E. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth
Circuit in an opinion by Justice O'Connor (California
v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21, 1990)).
1. The Court relied almost exclusively on the 1946
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decision in First Iowa
a. Although the case would have presented a 
"close question" if it were one of first 
impression, the Court believed itself 
constrained by First Iowa.
b. Relying on the strength of stare decisis. the 
Court adopted the principle that it is better 
to be consistent than to be right in 
statutory construction (see Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union. 491 U.S. ___ (1989)
(slip. op. at 4)).
Congress' passage of the Electric Consumers 
Protection Act confirmed FERC's "broad and 
paramount ... regulatory role" and affirmed 
Congress' concurrence with the balance struck in 
First Iowa and its progeny.
Allowing state regulatory control over minimum 
instream flows would require the Court 
"fundamentally to restructure" a "highly complex 
and long-enduring regulatory regime."
The Court rejected the argument that the 
discussion of section 27 in First Iowa was mere 
dicta.
California v. United States does not control the 
case and is not in tension with First Iowa, the
Court held.
a. The language of the Reclamation Act and 
Federal Power Act is similar but not 
identical.
b. The legislative history of the two statutes 
is more important than the words used; the 
histories are vastly different.
c. The purpose of the Federal Power Act is to 
provide an "active federal oversight role" 
while the Reclamation Act contemplates that 
the federal government will act like any 
ordinary holder of a state water right.
6. The California instream flow requirement is 
preempted because it "would disturb" and "actually 
conflicts" with, the "balance embodied" in the 
FERC instream flow requirements.
7. Although the Court's decision has reaffirmed the 
validity of First Iowa, it did not resolve that 
case's ambiguities.
a. When is a right a proprietary right?
b. When does a state regulatory scheme "actually 
conflict with" or "disturb" FERC's obligation 
to balance conflicting water needs?
c. If a licensee can comply with both FERC and 
state requirements (i.e. where the state 
imposes different or more stringent 
requirements than FERC), how does FERC
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determine whether a conflict or disturbance 
exists?
FERC Decisions After the Ninth Circuit Decision in
California ex rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC
1. Since the Ninth Circuit's decision in California 
ex rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC, FERC 
twice has cited that decision as providing further 
support for its authority to control and impact 
state water rights.
a. The FERC has found that it possesses 
authority to impair significantly the private 
use of state water rights (see, e.g.. Brazos 
River Auth.. 48 FERC 62,190 (1989)).
b. The FERC also has held that it may overrule 
state agency attempts to control the use of 
such water rights (see, e.g., Henwood 
Assocs.. Inc.. 50 FERC 61,183 (1990)).
2. The FERC does not view the Ninth Circuit's 
decision as providing new authority for its 
actions, but only as providing additional support 
for its long-standing view that First Iowa's 
interpretation of section 27 of the Federal Power 
Act enables the FERC in essence to preempt state 
water law (see Henwood Assocs., Inc.. 50 FERC f 




A. Although the Supreme Court in California v. FERC 
reaffirmed the validity of First Iowa after the 
Electric Consumers Protection Act and California v. 
United States, the Court did nothing to clarify the 
interplay between sections 9 and 27.
B. There appear to be three principal views on the role 
which FERC plays in regulating water rights.
1. One view is that FERC maintains regulatory 
authority to disregard any state law except those 
relating narrowly to the appropriation and use of 
water (proprietary rights only).
a. FERC can disregard state regulatory water 
rights.
b. Section 27 protects only vested water rights 
recognized by state law.
c. The Supreme Court appears to have adopted 
this approach.
d. Notwithstanding its doctrinal simplicity, 
this view may be difficult to apply because 
of the clouded line between proprietary 
rights and regulatory laws which are attached 
thereto.
2. An alternative view is that section 27 protects 
from preemption any state law which relates to 
control or appropriation of water usage.
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a. States retain right to regulate water rights.
b. State regulatory water laws effectively can 
veto a FERC license or can impose additional 
conditions on the exercise of license rights 
even if those conditions are inconsistent 
with FERC license conditions.
c. This broad reading of section 27 —  although 
consistent with its plain language —  
effectively has been killed by California v. 
FERC.
3. The best view appears to be that the states and 
FERC exercise concurrent authority over all 
hydroelectric regulatory matters, with disputes 
between FERC and the states settled based upon 
certain conflict resolution priorities.
a. The Supreme Court says that it has adopted 
this approach but is decisions suggest a 
dissatisfaction with concurrent authority
b. The Court is uneasy with any approach which 
requires resolution of conflicts between 
state and federal law.
C. States retain preeminent authority in limited areas.
1. State law is preeminent where vested rights are at 
issue or an unconstitutional taking would occur.
2. FERC must consult with the states over 
environmental, wildlife, and fishery protection
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issues under the Electric Consumers Protection
Act.
3. If state law allows for iristream flow water rights 
and such rights would be implicated by FERC 
action, state law should be applied to determine 
whether a taking would occur.
4. States may impose additional regulatory burdens on 
FERC licensees if to do so would not frustrate 
either the purpose of the Federal Power Act or the 
licensee's ability to operate its project.
a. FERC has broad authority to define the 
purpose of a project so as to preclude state 
regulation.
b. FERC's comprehensive planning obligation 
leaves little room for state regulatory 
requirements which might conceivably affect a 
basin-wide development plan.
D. FERC has comprehensive planning authority subject to 
the states' limited authority.
1. The Electric Consumers Protection Act clarifies 
FERC's long-standing regulatory supremacy.
2. FERC statutorily is charged with regulating 
hydroelectric power in a coordinated, basin-wide 
manner.
3. FERC may not disregard any state regulatory laws 
under section 9 unless compliance with both
36
federal and state law would be a physical 
impossibility or would impose a practical conflict 
violative of the purpose of the Federal Power Act.
E. FERC licensees must comply with the more stringent of 
the requirements imposed by either the state or FERC 
unless there is a practical conflict between those 
requirements, in which case FERC becomes the final 
arbiter of the dispute under section 9 of the Federal 
Power Act.
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PRINCIPAL STATUTORY AND CASE REFERENCES
A. FEDERAL POWER ACT PROVISIONS GRANTING FEDERAL CONTROL OVER
WATER RESOURCES IN CONTEXT OF HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT
1. Section 4(e). 16 U.S.C. § 797(e)
The Commission is authorized and empowered
(e) To issue licenses to citizens of the United States, or 
to any association of such citizens, or to any corporation 
organized under the laws of the United States or any State 
thereof, or to any State or municipality for the purpose of 
constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, 
reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines, or other project 
works necessary or convenient for the development and improvement 
of navigation and for the development, transmission, and 
utilization of power across, along, from or in any of the streams 
or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction 
under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
among the several States, or upon any part of the public lands 
and reservations of the United States (including the 
Territories), or for the purpose of utilizing the surplus water 
or water power from any Government dam, except as herein 
provided: Provided, That licenses shall be issued within any
reservation only after a finding by the Commission that the 
license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose 
for which such reservation was created or acquired, and shall be 
subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of the 
department under whose supervision such reservation falls shall 
deem necessary for the adequate protection and utilization of 
such reservation. Provided further. That no license affecting 
the navigable capacity of any navigable waters of the United 
States shall be issued until the plans of the dam or other 
structures affecting navigation have been approved by the Chief 
of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army. Whenever the 
contemplated improvement is, in the judgment of the Commission, 
desirable and justified in the public interest for the purpose of 
improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or 
benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, a finding to that 
effect shall be made by the Commission and shall become a part of 
the records of the Commission: Provided further. That in case
the Commission shall find that any Government dam may be 
advantageously used by the United States for public purposes in 
addition to navigation, no license therefor shall be issued until 
two years after it shall have reported to Congress the facts and 
conditions relating thereto, except that this provision shall not 
apply to any Government dam constructed prior to June 10, 1920: 
And provided further. That upon the filing of any application for 
a license which has not been preceded by a preliminary permit 
under subsection (f) of this section, notice shall be given and 
published as required by the proviso of said subsection. In 
deciding whether to issue any license under this Part for any 
project, the Commission, in addition to the power and development
purposes for which licenses are issued, shall give equal 
consideration to the purposes of energy conservation, the 
protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and 
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), the 
protection of recreational opportunities, and the preservation of 
other aspects of environmental quality.
2. Section 6, 16 U.S.C. § 799
Licenses under this Part shall be issued for a period not 
exceeding fifty years. Each such license shall be conditioned 
upon acceptance by the licensee of all the terms and conditions 
of this Act and such further conditions, if any, as the 
Commission shall prescribe in conformity with this Act, which 
said terms and conditions and the acceptance thereof shall be 
expressed in said license. Licenses may be revoked only for the 
reasons and in the manner prescribed under the provisions of this 
Act, and may be altered or surrendered only upon mutual agreement 
between the licensee and the Commission after thirty days' public 
notice. Copies of all licenses issued under the provisions of 
this Part and calling for the payment of annual charges shall be 
deposited with the General Accounting Office, in compliance with 
section 3743, Revised Statutes, as amended (U.S.C., title 41, 
sec. 20).
3. Section 7(a). 16 U.S.C. 5 800(a)
(a) In issuing preliminary permits hereunder or original 
licenses where no preliminary permit has been issued, the 
Commission shall give preference to applications therefor by 
States and municipalities, provided the plans for the same are 
deemed by the Commission equally well adapted, or shall within a 
reasonable time to be fixed by the Commission be made equally 
well adapted, to conserve and utilize in the public interest the 
water resources of the region; and as between other applicants, 
the Commission may give preference to the applicant the plans of 
which it finds and determines are best adapted to develop, 
conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water resources 
of the region, if it be satisfied as to the ability of the 
applicant to carry out such plans.
4. Section 9(a). 16 U.S.C. 5 802(a)
(a) Each applicant for a license under this chapter shall 
submit to the commission --
(1) Such maps, plans, specifications, and estimates of cost 
as may be required for a full understanding of the proposed 
project. Such maps, plans, and specifications when approved by 
the Commission shall be made a part of the license; and 
thereafter no change shall be made in said maps, plans, or 
specifications until such changes shall have been approved and 
made a part of such license by the Commission.
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(2) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied 
with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within 
which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed 
and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water 
for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the 
business of developing, transmitting, and distributing power, and 
in any other business necessary to effect the purposes of a 
license under this Act.
5. Section 10(a), 16 U.S.C. 5 803 (aHl)
All licenses issued under this Part shall be on the 
following conditions:
(a)(1) That the project adopted, including the maps, plans, 
and specifications, shall be such as in the judgment of the 
Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for 
improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or 
benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement 
and utilization of water power development, for the adequate 
protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife 
(including related spawning grounds and habitat), and for other 
beneficial public uses, including irrigation, flood water, water 
supply, and recreational and other purposes referred to in 
section 4(e) if necessary in order to secure such plan the 
Commission shall have authority to require the modification of 
any project and of the plans and specification of the project 
works before approval.
6. Section 10(i). 16 U.S.C. $ 803(i)
All licenses issued under this Part shall be on the 
following conditions:
(j)(l) That in order to adequately and equitably protect, 
mitigate damages to, and enhance, fish and wildlife (including 
related spawning grounds and habitat) affected by the 
development, operation, and management of the project, each 
license issued under this Part shall include conditions for such 
protection, mitigation, and enhancement. Subject to paragraph 
(2), such conditions shall be based on recommendations received 
pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. 661 
et seq.) from the National Marine Fisheries Service, the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service, and State fish and wildlife 
agencies.
(2) Whenever the Commission believes that any 
recommendation referred to in paragraph (1) may be inconsistent 
with the purposes and requirements of this Part or other 
applicable law, the Commission and the agencies referred to in 
paragraph (1) shall attempt to resolve any such inconsistency, 
giving due weight to the recommendations, expertise, and
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statutory responsibilities of such agencies. If, after such 
attempt, the Commission does not adopt in whole or in part a 
recommendation of any such agency, the Commission shall publish 
each of the following findings (together with a statement of the 
basis for each of the findings):
(A) A finding that adoption of such recommendation is 
inconsistent with the purposes and requirements of this Part or 
with other applicable provisions of law.
(B) A finding that the conditions selected by the 
Commission comply with the requirements of paragraph (1).
Subsection (i) shall not apply to the conditions required under 
this subsection.
7. Section 21. 16 U.S.C. 5 814
When any licensee can not acquire by contract or pledges an 
unimproved dam site or the right to use or damage the lands or 
property of others necessary to the construction, maintenance, or 
operation of any dam, reservoir, diversion structure, or the 
works appurtenant or accessory thereto, in conjunction with an 
improvement which in the judgment of the Commission is desirable 
and justified in the public interest for the purpose of improving 
or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of 
interstate or foreign commerce, it may acquire the same by the 
exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of 
the United States for the district in which such land or other 
property may be located, or in the State courts. The practice 
and procedure in any action or proceedings for that purpose in 
the district court of the United States shall conform as nearly 
as may be with the practice and procedure in similar action or 
proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is 
situated: Provided. That United States district courts shall
only have jurisdiction of cases when the amount claimed by the 
owner of the property to be condemned exceeds $3,000.
8. Section 27. 16 U.S.C. § 821
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or 
intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of 
the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, 
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal 
or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.
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B. PRINCIPAL AND RECENT COURT CASES
1. California v. FERC. ___ U.S. ___1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21,
1990)
[See discussion of Ninth Circuit opinion below]
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit 
opinion, holding that the principle of stare decisis demanded 
adherence to First Iowa Hvdro-Electric Power Coop, v. Federal 
Power Comm1n . although were the issue one of first impression, it 
would present a "close guestion." While the decision was based 
almost entirely on First Iowa, the Court did hold that Congress' 
enactment of the Electgric Consumers Protection Act reaffirmed 
FERC's broad and paramount control over hydroelectric power 
resources. The Court also rejected the parallel between language 
in section 27 of the Federal Power Act and substantially similar 
language in section 8 of the Reclamation Act.
2. First Iowa Hvdro-Electric Coop, v. Federal Power Comm'n. 328
U.S. 152, 66 S.Ct. 906 (1946).
The petitioner applied to the Federal Power Commission for a 
license to operate a hydroelectric project without attempting to 
comply with an Iowa law which forbids dam construction without a 
state permit. The Commission granted the license nonetheless, 
citing its authority under section 9 of the Federal Power Act. 
Because the state law purported to impose a permit requirement 
which supplemented the federal permit requirement, the Court held 
that the applicant was not required to comply with Iowa law as a 
condition precedent to a federal license. The Court 
distinguished between sections 9 and 27 of the Federal Power Act. 
Section 27, which protects state law from supersedure by the 
Federal Power Act, is limited to those laws which relate to the 
protection of property rights in water. Section 9 has broader 
reach, and applies in all circumstances in which property rights 
are not at issue. Section 9 does not require compliance with 
state law but only empowers the Federal Power Commission to 
require such evidence of compliance with state law as, in the 
Commission's judgment, would be "appropriate to effect the 
purposes of the federal license on the navigable waters of the 
United States."
The Court explained that the Federal Power Act establishes a 
dual system of control between the state and federal government 
in which there is a "division of the common enterprise between 
two cooperating agencies of government, each with final authority 
in its own jurisdiction. The duality does not require two 
agencies to share in the final decision of the same issue. Where
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the Federal Government supercedes the state government there is 
no suggestion that the two agencies both shall have final 
authority." States retain regulatory control only over 
allocation of proprietary rights. Regulatory matters are within 
the exclusive purview of the federal government, the Court 
concluded; within the regulatory arena, an applicant need not 
comply with any state laws if such laws could conceivably 
conflict with the federal scheme.
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the Federal 
Power Act in noting that state authority was severely limited. 
Even as to control of water rights, the states retained authority 
only because of the explicit provision to such effect in the 
Federal Power Act. Citing United States v. Appalachian Power 
Co.. 311 U.S. 377 (1940), the Court noted that state control over
waters within their borders is "subject to the acknowledged 
jurisdiction of the United States under the Constitution in 
regard to commerce and the navigation of the waters and rivers."
3. Federal Power Comm1n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. , 347 U.S.
239, 74 S.Ct. 487 (1954).
A challenge was brought to an order of the Federal Power 
Commission which disallowed, as amortization reserve, the 
expenses which Niagara Falls Power Company had to pay for the use 
of private water rights needed as part of its power project. The 
Commission had disallowed the expenses because it considered 
those rights no longer to exist. The Court of Appeals' reversal 
of that decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. At issue was 
whether the Federal Power Act abolished water rights which 
interfered with the operation of federally-licensed projects.
The Court explained that, although water rights are usufructuary 
rights, the Federal Power Act treats those rights no differently 
from other property rights. While the Act allows for federal 
purchase or condemnation of such rights, the Act does not have 
the effect of seizing, abolishing, or eliminating water rights 
without compensation, the Court held. Preexisting water rights 
are to survive unless purchased.
4. Washington Dep't of Game v. Federal Power Comm1n. 207 F.2d
391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert, denied. 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
The state petitioned for review of a Federal Power 
Commission order granting a license to a municipality to operate 
a dam. The state had opposed the license on the grounds that the 
municipality had not sought or received permits from the 
Department of Fisheries and Game for the dam construction. Under 
First Iowa, the court held that the Commission was acting within 
its discretionary authority when it failed to require the 
municipality to demonstrate its compliance with the laws of 
Washington state. Notwithstanding the state's claim that the 
federal dam would have disastrous impacts on the state fisheries,
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the court noted that if the project "will destroy the fish 
industry of the river, we are powerless to prevent it."
5. California v. Federal Power Comm'n. 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 941 (1965).
Both the state and the licensees challenged a Federal Power 
Commission order which imposed conditions on operation of a 
hydroelectric project for the protection of downstream fisheries. 
The Federal Power Commission order mandated specified instream 
flows to maintain salmon runs in the river. The licensee 
claimed, and the Federal Power Commission did not dispute, that 
the conditions impaired their ability to deliver irrigation water 
pursuant to state water rights. The court held that the Federal 
Power Commission had the authority under section 27 of the 
Federal Power Act to impose a license condition "which would 
operate to impair the districts' full use of their irrigation 
water rights in some future year." The holding was based, in 
part, upon the court's conclusion that the licensee was protected 
by a reopener clause in the license which provided for 
application to the Commission for changes in the license 
conditions for emergency situations. The court explicitly 
concluded that the Federal Power Commission "has the legal 
authority to take appropriate action restricting the use of such 
irrigation rights, should the occasion arise."
6. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n. 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926 (1972).
The City of New York intervened in a long-disputed Federal 
Power Commission proceeding over a pumped-storage hydroelectric 
project on the Hudson River in New York. Numerous challenges 
were raised to the Federal Power Commission order granting the 
license. The City of New York argued that the license violated 
section 27 of the Federal Power Act because the project posed a 
potential danger to, and therefore interfered with, a New York- 
owned aqueduct. The court held that, pursuant to section 9, the 
Federal Power Commission had adequately considered the 
interference issue before granting the license. New York should 
not be permitted to exercise a veto over the license merely 
because it disagreed with the Federal Power Commission 
conclusion, the court held, quoting from First Iowa.
7. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. FERC. 868 F.2d 592
(3d Cir. 1989).
The state brought suit challenging FERC's refusal to reopen 
a licensing proceeding to consider the state's input into the 
environmental review process. The state argued that the FERC 
license interfered with state property and Pennsylvania law 
regulating lands and water. The court rejected the state's
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argument and held that, under First Iowa, a state retains only 
very limited authority. Quoting First Iowa, the court explained 
that the Federal Power Act does not "permit interference with 
certain state laws relating 'to the control, appropriation, use 
or distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other 
uses of the same nature.'" States do not retain control over 
matters such as pollution, flood control, aesthetics, recreation, 
and natural resources conservation, the court held.
8. State of California ex rel. State Water Resources Bd. v.
FERC, 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1989), cert, granted. 110 S.Ct.
537 (1989), aff'd. __  U.S. ___, 1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21,
1990)
California sought review of a FERC order which set water 
flow rates for a FERC-1icensed hydroelectric project. California 
alleged that the State Water Resources Control Board had the 
authority to set terms and conditions on water flow pursuant to 
state law, notwithstanding a FERC order which set a minimum flow 
rate. California argued that the licensee had to comply not with 
the FERC-imposed instream flow conditions but also with the more 
stringent minimum flow conditions which it had set. So long as 
the licensee complied with state law, it claimed, the licensee 
automatically would comply with FERC-imposed conditions.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Power Act preempted 
state law and that FERC, therefore, had exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine the instream flow that the project operator had to 
preserve in Rock Creek. At issue was whether the FERC's 
imposition of minimum flow releases for fishery protection and 
other purposes was an integral part of FERC's comprehensive 
planning and licensing authority under section 10(a) of the 
Federal Power Act. The court contrasted section 27 of the 
Federal Power Act, which provides that the Act is not intended 
"to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of the 
respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or 
distribution of water..." with section 4(e), section 10(a), and 
section 7(a). The Ninth Circuit held that the "weight of the 
comprehensive planning authority and the individual powers 
assigned to support that authority falls quite heavily on the 
side of federal exclusivity."
The Court rejected California v. United States. 438 U.S. 645 
(1978) in favor of First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop, v. FPC. 328 
U.S. 152 (1946). The court held that the Federal Power Act, read 
as a whole, teaches that "Congress intended federal law to 
preempt state regulation in all aspects of hydropower projects 
save for the limited proprietary exceptions specified" in section 27.
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9. Town of Springfield v. Vermont Envtl. Bd.. 521 F. Supp. 243
(D. Vt. 1981).
Town brought action challenging a state order which 
prohibited the town from proceeding with a hydroelectric project 
until it obtained a state land use permit. The district court 
held that the state order was void because the state's 
withholding of a state permit had the effect of thwarting a 
project the permit for which was regulated by FERC. The Court 
rejected the state's argument that it was entitled at least to 
regulate "corollary improvements" relating to highways and 
recreational areas which were not used in connection with the 
generation of hydroelectric power. The Court held that the 
reservation of authority to the states in section 27 of the 
Federal Power Act was limited to those specific areas enumerated 
in the statute and, as to other matters, exclusive regulatory 
jurisdiction lay with FERC. The Federal Power Act prohibits a 
state from requiring a permit for any matter related to a FERC- 
licensed project if such a permit is a condition precedent to 
obtaining a federal license. In explaining the pervasiveness of 
FERC regulation of hydro projects, the court stated that there is 
a "clear Congressional intent to bring all aspects of [a] 
hydroelectric project within the purview of the federal 
regulatory scheme."
10. Mega Renewables v. County of Shasta. 644 F. Supp. 491 (E.D.
Cal. 1986).
Plaintiffs alleged that a local ordinance and section 1603 
of the California Fish and Game Code both were preempted by the 
Federal Power Act to the extent that the state law affected 
federal hydropower projects. On motion for summary judgment, the 
court held that the state law was not preempted but the local 
ordinance was. The state law was valid, the court concluded, 
because it required only the submission of information to the 
state and did not purport to impose a permit requirement which 
could have the effect of vetoing a federal project. The court 
explained that First Iowa prohibited only those state laws which 
otherwise would allow a state veto of a federal project. Noting 
that courts are reluctant to infer preemption of an entire field, 
the court explicitly rejected the argument that the Federal Power 
Act preempts the entire field of water power projects. Unlike 
the state law, the local ordinance imposed a permit requirement 
on all hydro projects. Reading First Iowa to prohibit any non- 
federal permitting requirement, the court struck down the local 
permit ordinance.
11. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma. 262 P.2d 214, 43
Wash. 2d 468 (1953).
The City of Tacoma brought a declaratory judgment action 
seeking determination of whether it had to comply with Washington
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state fishery protection laws in order to operate a federally 
licensed dam within the state. The court noted that compliance 
with Washington fishery laws would force abandonment of the 
project and that by enforcing those laws, therefore, the state 
effectively could veto the federal hydropower license. Because 
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution prohibited 
a state veto over a federal action, the court held that where 
state and federal statutes cannot be reconciled, "the action of a 
state even under its police power must give way." The court 
further held that the Federal Power Act had preempted the entire 
field of regulation of dams on navigable waters.
12. Oregon v. Idaho Power Co.. 312 P.2d 583, 211 Or. 284 (1957).
Idaho Power Company was indicted for constructing a 
hydroelectric project without a license from the Oregon 
Hydroelectric Commission. Although conceding that the project 
was constructed over navigable waters, Oregon claimed that the 
"use and appropriation of water rights ... is within the control 
and authority vested in the state of Oregon and not within the 
authority of the licensing power of the Federal Power 
Commission." Quoting from First Iowa, the court disagreed, 
holding that the section 27 savings clause of the Federal Power 
Act only protects state proprietary rights, not state regulatory 
powers. Under section 27, the state is entitled only to 
compensation under the takings clause of the United States 
Constitution.
C. PRINCIPAL RECENT FERC CASES
1. Henwood Assocs. , Inc. 50 FERC 61,183 (Feb. 15, 1990).
In an original license proceeding, the FERC determined that 
recommendations of the California Department of Fish and Game 
regarding minimum flows would render the project uneconomic if 
implemented. FERC therefore rejected the agency's proposed 
minimum flows and implemented those recommended by its staff.
The FERC also found that minimum flows required by the 
California Water Resources Control Board as a condition of a 
Clean Water Act section 401 water quality certificate were not 
enforceable against the proposed project because the FERC found 
the Water Resources Board to have waived the section 401 
certification requirement for the project. In discussing the 
Water Resources Board's actions, the FERC cited California ex 
rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. FERC. 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 
1989) in rejecting the Board's assertion that it had authority 
under state law to establish minimum flows. The FERC noted, 
however, that State of California did not "address the issue of 
whether the Water Resources Board is authorized under the Clean 
Water Act to establish minimum flows by adoption of minimum flow 
conditions in a state water rights permit." (This issue needs to
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be addressed, although the FERC is unlikely to be the one to 
decide the point, because the FERC has consistently held that 
"review of the appropriateness of a section 401(a)(1) 
certification condition is a matter for the state courts, not a 
federal agency or court.")
In Henwood. the FERC also found that the Bureau of Land 
Management has authority under the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (FLPMA), to require 
project licensees to obtain FLPMA right-of-way permits. In this 
proceeding, the BLM had issued a permit containing a condition 
that the project release certain minimum flows —  flows identical 
to those recommended by California Fish & Game and rejected by 
the FERC as rendering the project uneconomic. The FERC noted its 
belief that a FLPMA right-of-way permit is not necessarily a 
prerequisite to issuance of a license nor is it a condition of 
such license, unless the permit is issued to protect a federal 
"reservation," in which case the FERC must include the permit's 
conditions in a project's license pursuant to section 4(e) of the 
Federal Power Act. The FERC indicated its discomfort with its 
finding that hydro projects must obtain FLPMA permits by stating 
"[i]t appears to us that the denial or conditioning of a right- 
of-way under FLPMA should not be allowed to be a de facto veto of 
the Commission's license. Indeed, it may well be that BLM has 
exceeded its authority under FLPMA in imposing such conditions in 
the grant of the right-of-way. However, we recognize that this 
is a matter for the courts to decide."
2. Central Nebraska Pub. Power and Irrigation Dist.. 50 FERC ?
61,180 (Feb. 14, 1990).
In this order, the FERC responded to the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals' decision in Platte River Whooping Crane Critical 
Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC. 876 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
in which the court had reversed the FERC's prior refusal to 
impose interim measures to protect whooping crane habitat (and 
that of several other endangered or threatened species) pending 
the completion of relicensing proceedings for two Nebraska hydro 
projects. The Commission found that the potential for 
significant, irreversible injury to the whooping crane's habitat 
in central Nebraska justified the imposition of interim measures 
requiring, among other things, maintenance of certain instream 
flows downstream of the two projects.
The FERC found, however, that it possessed authority to 
impose interim conditions only on one of the projects, the 
downstream project of the two. Due to the small amount of 
storage in the downstream project's facilities, however, the FERC 
had to tie the magnitude of the required flows to the volume of 
water stored in the upstream project's reservoir. (Although it 
lacked authority to impose unilateral conditions on the upstream 
project's license, the FERC implored the upstream project
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operator to assist in facilitating the required flows). When the 
volume of storage in the upstream reservoir equalled 1.3 million 
acre-feet or more, minimum instream flows (in an approximately 
118 mile stretch of the Platte River) would be required which 
would vary depending on the endangered resources' seasonal 
requirements. When the volume of storage was between 900,000 
acre-feet and 1.3 million acre-feet, a constant minimum flow of 
400 cubic feet per second would be required. No minimum flows 
would be imposed when storage was less than 900,000 acre-feet.
3. Eugene Water and Elec. Bd., 49 FERC J 61,211 (Nov. 16,
1989) .
FERC in this case found that it possessed no authority to 
impose minimum flows on a new project located at an existing U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers dam, because the Corps had sole control 
over the dam's release schedule. The Corps would release water 
from the dam as necessary to satisfy the authorized purposes of 
the dam (flood control, recreation and conservation); power would 
be generated only when such releases so allowed.
4. Brazos River Auth.. 48 FERC  ̂ 62,190 (Sept. 14, 1989).
In this case, the FERC's Director of Hydropower Licensing 
addressed a conflict among water supply obligations of a 
licensee, recreational use of a dam's reservoir and minimum 
releases from the dam necessary to protect downstream fishery 
resources. The case involved the new license application of a 
project operator whose 50-year federal license for the Morris 
Sheppard Dam was expiring. At its maximum storage level, the dam 
impounded approximately 570,200 acre-feet of water contained in a 
reservoir with a surface area of 17,600 acres. The dam was 
operated in a "peaking" mode, with water released from the dam 
only when power generation was needed to meet electric system 
power demands or when releases were required to meet downstream 
water supply requirements.
As a preliminary matter, the Director of Hydropower 
Licensing found that the FERC had exclusive authority to control 
flow regimes at the dam, citing to California ex rel. State Water 
Resources Bd. v. FERC. "[S]tates must yield to the Commission 
when a state's and the Commission's respective authorities over 
state waters are in conflict." Given the FERC's preeminent 
authority, the Director went on to discuss how the FERC staff 
resolved conflicts among the various uses of the Morris Sheppard 
Dam and its reservoir.
The Director found that consistent with sections 4(e) and 
10(a) of the Federal Power Act, the FERC was required "to 
consider and balance, in the public interest, all uses of the 
waterway on which a project is proposed to be located." The FERC 
staff therefore developed a minimum flow regime that included a
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drought contingency plan that would reduce the required minimum 
flows in times of drought in order to mitigate the impact on the 
licensee's water supply obligations and on recreational use of 
the reservoir. Nevertheless, the staff did not go as far as the 
licensee desired, instead deciding that minimum flows had to be 
maintained, at least in part, in times of drought in order to 
protect downstream aquatic resources. The Director's order in 
this case therefore represents an attempt to strike a balance 
between the competing needs of aquatic resources on the one hand, 
and water supply and reservoir recreation on the other.
5. Meaa Renewables 47 FERC f 61,194 (May 4, 1989).
In Mega Renewables, certain landowners contested the FERC's 
issuance of an exemption from licensing for a small hydro 
project. The landowners alleged that operation of the project 
would adversely affect existing water rights holders by changing 
the prevailing regime of water releases, diversion and uses. The 
FERC rejected these allegations by referring to an agreement 
between the hydro developer and the water users' association (of 
which the contesting landowners were members) wherein the 
developer agreed that its rights to water for power generation 
purposes were subordinate to the water users'. The FERC found 
that this agreement assured that the proposed hydro project would 
not interfere with the landowners' water rights.
6. Conway Ranch. 46 FERC J 62,332 (March 31, 1989)
The FERC's Director of Hydropower Licensing rejected in 
Conwav Ranch a license applicant's argument that state 
adjudicated water rights cannot be abrogated by FERC. The FERC 
required as a condition of its issuance of a license for the 
applicant's proposed hydro project that the project release 
minimum flows varying from 1.5 to 4.0 cubic feet per second, 
depending upon the amount of inflow to the project's facilities. 
The FERC also imposed a condition on the license requiring the 
project to release flushing flows in June of each year. The FERC 
justified its action by reasoning that "the fact that the 
applicant is free to use [its adjudicated allotment of] 6 cfs for 
irrigation purposes does not mean that it is similarly free to 
use the water for hydroelectric generation without restriction.
It is well established that the Commission may include a 
condition in a license which would impair the licensee's full use 
of its water rights." (Citing California v. Federal Power 
Comm'n. 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965).
More than a year later, the applicant refused the FERC 
license for the project in order to protect its 128-year 
irrigation water right. See Hvdro-Wire vol. 11, no. 10 at 5 (May 
21, 1990).
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7. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 46 FERC 5 61,249 (Feb. 27, 1989).
In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.. a hydro license article 
reserving to the FERC authority to require modification of 
project operations for the protection and development of fish and 
wildlife resources was read to include authority to require 
changes in minimum flows in the future. The licensee had argued 
that the FERC authority to require changes in project operation 
was limited to instances "where some major, unexpected change in 
circumstances arose."
In response, the Commission rebutted the licensee's 
arguments with references to the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
California v. Federal Power Comm'n. 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965) 
("When the Commission reasonably foresees the possibility that a 
need may develop years in the future requiring, in the public 
interest, the imposition of a burden upon the licensee at that 
time, but either the dimensions of the need or the way of meeting 
it is not presently ascertainable, the license terms cannot 
possibly speak with definiteness and precision concerning the 
matter. Under these circumstances, it is sufficient, under 
section 6 [of the FPA], to include in the license a condition 
reserving the problem, including the licensee's rights to test 
the validity of any future action taken."), South Carolina Elec.
& Gas Co.. 30 FPC 1338 (1963) ("The Commission in recent months 
had undertaken a review of hydroelectric licenses in the interest 
of making the most effective use of its authority to impose 
conditions upon licensee[s] in the public interest.... This 
review has increased our awareness of the potential contribution 
of the license conditions to comprehensive resource 
development."), and Trinity River Auth. of Texas. 41 FERC 5 
61,300 (1987). The FERC summarized its views by stating that its 
"obligation under Section 10(a) [of the FPA] is a continuing one 
throughout the term of the license. When information becomes 
available to us, through our staff, another agency, the licensee, 
or the public in general, that a project may no longer conform to 
the comprehensive development standard, we may investigate that 
situation and then require changes to project operation or 
facilities as our authority permits."
8. Twin Falls Canal Co.. 45 FERC 62,534 (Dec. 15, 1988)
In this proceeding, the FERC required, as part of mitigating 
the cumulative impacts on fish and wildlife of the project under 
consideration and three other Snake River Basin projects, that 
the project licensee participate in a "comprehensive water 
block," which would provide for varying water releases from each 
project, depending upon resource needs. The Commission also 
required that the licensee purchase and/or lease water from the 
State of Idaho's "Water Bank" if necessary to satisfy the 
required minimum flow releases.
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FERC reviewed the proposed conditions to the project license 
under its duty to ensure that the project is consistent with the 
best comprehensive use of the waterway. In developing the 
required minimum flow regime, FERC therefore rejected an agency's 
proposed flow regime as having too great an impact on irrigation 
and power generation. The flow regime rejected by the Commission 
would have required releases of 300 cfs in the irrigation season 
and 1260 cfs in the non-irrigation season. Instead, the 
Commission adopted a minimum flow regime requiring year-round 
releases of 200 cfs for fish and wildlife purposes. The FERC 
also approved special 10,000 cfs releases on eight days in May 
and June of each year when such flows would be available for 
Whitewater boaters.
The Commission authorized the licensee to release flows less 
than the required minimums when sufficient water was unavailable 
from the state "Water Bank" or from water surplus to irrigation 
needs. The Commission expressly rejected, however, the State of 
Idaho's request that the FERC include in the project license a 
condition subordinating the use of water for hydropower 
generation to use of water for upstream depletions, including 
irrigation. "[T]he subordination clause ... could nullify the 
balance struck by us under the comprehensive planning provisions 
of Section 10(a)(1) of the FPA in issuing the license. 
Consequently, inclusion of the open-ended water subordination 
clause in the license as requested by [the state] would interfere 
with the exercise of our comprehensive planning responsibilities 
under Section 10(a)(1) of the FPA and thus would be inconsistent 
with the scheme of regulation established by the FPA, which vests 
in the Commission the exclusive authority to determine whether, 
and under what conditions, a license should issue." (Citing to 
First Iowa). The Commission acknowledged that the State of Idaho 
was not precluded from petitioning the FERC in the future for a 
determination that hydropower generation at the project should be 
reduced to accommodate upstream water uses.
9. Guadaloupe-Blanco River Auth.. 42 FERC f 61,079 (Jan. 28,
1988) .
FERC's decision in this case was significant in that it was 
the first proceeding involving post-ECPA environmental review in 
which the Commission asserted its authority to impose minimum 
flows for fishery protection in opposition to a state's 
assertions of exclusive jurisdiction over water rights. (The 
Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership cases, and the Ninth Circuit's 
affirmance of the FERC's decisions in those cases —  California 
ex rel. State Water Resources Bd.. involved pre-ECPA 
environmental review by the FERC).
The Commission found that "to the extent Texas water right 
laws would require a release regime for the project that
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conflicts with the minimum flow requirements contained in the 
license, those laws are inconsistent with the scheme of the FPA 
and are superseded by it. ... [Wjhile Section 27 protects 
"proprietary" rights in water acquired from a state, it does not 
abrogate the Commission's authority to require a licensee to 
release water from its licensed project for fishery protection 
and other purposes. ... [Section 27] only establishes a right of 
compensation for vested water rights taken by a Commission 
licensee."
10. Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership. 38 FERC 61,240 (March 11, 
1987), reh'q denied. 41 FERC J 61,198 (Nov. 20, 1987), 
affirmed in California ex rel. State Water Resources Bd. v. 
FERC. 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1989), cert, granted. 110 S.Ct.
537 (1989), aff'd. ___ U.S. ___, 1990 LEXIS 2614 (May 21,
1990) .
In its two orders, the Commission found the Supreme Court's 
decision in First Iowa to be controlling precedent concerning the 
authority of states to impose minimum flow releases from FERC- 
licensed hydro projects. The FERC therefore found that the 
California Water Resources Control Board was preempted from 
imposing minimum flow requirements. "[T]he authority to impose 
minimum flow releases resides exclusively with [the Commission], 
since it is an integral part of our responsibilities under 
Section 10(a)."
11. Roseburg Resources. 41 FERC 5 61,142 (Nov. 6, 1987).
In this case the FERC cited both First Iowa and the first 
Rock Creek order as support for rejecting the minimum flows 
recommended by a California state agency to be released from a 
new project. "[T]he establishment of minimum flows is a matter 
beyond the reach of state regulation."
12. Howard & Mildred Carter. 40 FERC  ̂ 61,280 (Sept. 18, 1987).
In Carter. the FERC rejected the license applicants' claim 
that they had the right to dewater the stream on which the 
proposed hydro project would be located. The Commission stated 
that "[a] licensee must accept the reasonable restrictions and 
obligations that the Commission attaches to" a hydropower 
license. "The Commission has clear authority to require a 4 cfs 
minimum flow release at the project, even if such requirement 
impairs the licensee's irrigation water rights."
13. City of Santa Clara. 20 FERC H 61,257 (Aug. 31, 1982), reh'q 
denied. 22 FERC f 61,121 (Feb. 4, 1983).
In these two orders, the FERC considered complaints by a 
water users association that operation of the proposed project 
would require utilization of water rights not possessed by the
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project licensee. The Commission found that if the licensee was 
unsuccessful in obtaining the requisite water rights under state 
law, then the licensee could obtain these property interests 
under Section 21 of the FPA.
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